Academic Salaries and Public Evaluation of University Research: Evidence from the UK Research Excellence Framework by De Fraja, Gianni et al.
Academic Salaries and
Public Evaluation of University Research:
Evidence from the UK Research Excellence Framework∗
Gianni De Fraja† Giovanni Facchini‡ John Gathergood§
April 4, 2019
Abstract
We study the effects of public evaluation of university research on the pay structures of academic
departments. A simple equilibrium model of university pay determination shows how the
pay-performance relationship can be explained by the incentives inherent in the research
evaluation process. We then analyse the pay-performance relationship using data on the salary of
all UK university full professors, matched to the performance of their departments from the 2014
UK government evaluation of research, the Research Excellence Framework (REF). A cross
sectional empirical analysis shows that both average pay level and pay inequality in a department
are positively related to performance. It also shows that the pay-performance relationship is
driven by a feature of the research evaluation that allows academics to transfer the affiliation of
published research across universities. To assess the effect of the REF on pay structure, we take
advantage of the time dimension of our data and of inherent uncertainty in the evaluation of the
performance of academic departments generated by the rules of the exercise. Our results indicate
that higher achieving departments benefit from increased subsequent hiring and higher
professorial salaries with the salary benefits of REF performance concentrated among the highest
paid professors.
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1 Introduction
Many countries, particularly in Europe, have in recent years introduced public evaluation of the
scientific research carried out by universities. The outcome of these evaluations affects directly the
allocation of public funding to the university sector and is an important input to produce rankings
used by students, industry, the media, and other users to measure university quality. In this paper
we study the effects of a national research evaluation of academic departments on departmental
wage structure using a rich dataset covering all UK universities. Two features of the UK setting make
it ideally suited to study this question. First, the UK has a systematic and comprehensive assessment
of research provided by the Research Excellence Framework (REF). This determines the government
“block” research funding, a significant source of research income for UK institutions. The importance
of REF performance is also leveraged by its contribution to the ranking published in several
university league tables. As a result, it also affects indirectly other sources of research income,
post-graduate student recruitment,1 and prestige. Second, unlike many other European countries,
the size of academic departments and full professors’ compensation are not subject to national
regulation, other than an agreed minimum salary. Hence universities are free to determine
professorial hirings and set professorial pay. Indeed, our data exhibits large observed salary
differences, with the highest paid professors in some of the elite institutions earning as much as
seven times the national minimum. A fundamental question is then how performance in the REF
translates to wage structures at the department level.
Our analysis draws upon a dataset comprising details of salaries paid to full professors at all UK
departments between 2013 and 2016 and the performance of their department in the REF carried out
in 2014. Together, these data allow us to evaluate the association between the department’s pay
structure and its performance in the REF and the effects of departmental performance on subsequent
outcomes. The university sector in the UK is an example of a quasi-market, where individual
institutions compete, often fiercely, according to rules designed by the government to mimic the
incentive system operating in the private markets. In the latter, the literature (e.g. Nickell and
Wadhwani 1990, Nickell et al. 1994, Hildreth and Oswald 1997, Abowd et al. 1999, and Lazear 2000)
has long firmly established a positive correlation between firm performance and average pay. Some
evidence suggests also that firms with higher within-firm pay inequality might improve performance
(Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen 2008, Edmans and Gabaix 2016, Mueller et al. 2017). Our first
contribution is to analyse whether this also holds true for universities. A subject of amused or heated
discussions among academics, there is surprisingly little systematic evidence on this important
question. Stephan (2012) finds that, in the three decades prior to 2006, salary inequality by rank more
than doubled for every rank in US academia within four broad areas, namely engineering,
maths/computer science, physical sciences, and life sciences. Otherwise the literature is limited, and
has focused on broad national differences in university pay (Altbach et al. 2012) or the internal labor
markets of universities (Oyer 2007, Haeck and Verboven 2012) rather than variation among
institutions within a country.
1This can be an important source of funding for some departments; income from undergraduate students, on the other
hand, is unlikely to be affected by a good REF performance. This is so both because fees are capped, and because students
choose on the basis of word of mouth information from their teachers, or from newspaper rankings which give a negligible
weight to research.
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To frame our analysis, we present a theoretical model of university pay determination where
universities face a national competitive evaluation of their research, and aim at maximising an
aggregate measure of research success. This in turn determines the research funding they will receive
from the government. Research is produced using elastically supplied capital and different kinds of
labour, to capture the diverse attributes of the academics employed. Among the various models that
can be built to capture the structure of the university sector, and the internal organisations of
individual universities, our model allows us to highlight the key role played by the internal wage
structure and predicts a positive correlation between the research performance of a department, the
average salary of its staff, and inequality in departmental pay.
Our empirical analysis consists of two conceptually distinct parts. In line with the theoretical
model, in Section 4 we uncover a positive cross-sectional relationship between professorial pay in
UK universities and their 2014 REF performance. This is best interpreted as capturing the
steady-state, static equilibrium of the theoretical model. This finding is very robust: it holds when we
control for a range of departmental characteristics and for academic discipline and university type
fixed effects. It also holds across the whole range of academic disciplines. Interestingly, we find that
the pay-performance relationship is weaker, though still statistically significant, in the most
well-known research intensive universities, and stronger among those established more recently. We
also find a positive relationship between professorial pay inequality within a department and REF
performance at the department level. Unlike for the mean salary, this finding is strongest in the most
prestigious universities, and is statistically significant for disciplines in the sciences and engineering,
but not in medicine and biology, the social sciences, the arts and humanities.
In Sections 5 and 6 we study instead the effects of the assessment on the subsequent evolution of
a department’s composition and wage structure. To do so, we exploit the existence of two distinct
measures of performance. First, the funding score received by a department determines the financial
transfer made by the government funding agency to the university. Second, the grade point average
score (GPA) is the headline perceived quality measure (reputation) used to compare departments
across institutions and disciplines. These two scores are calculated differently – see Box 3 for more
details – and their correlation, while positive, is far from perfect. As a result, it might well happen
that two departments with the same reputation, measured by the GPA, receive different funding
allocations; and analogously two departments with the same funding score could be ranked
differently according to GPA. Importantly, these difference are unlikely to be perfectly anticipated by
the institutions and their highly unpredictable nature likens them to a random allocation of
additional funding to some departments, in preference to others, observationally very similar.
Difference-in-differences estimates on a matched sample of departments therefore allows us to
estimate the independent effects of funding conditional on research quality (and vice-versa) on
subsequent developments in the composition and pay structure of the department
Our findings show that departments which obtain a stronger REF result see faster subsequent
growth in wages and professorial headcount compared with less performing, but otherwise similar
departments. Importantly, this effect is statistically significant only when performance is measured
by GPA, but not when it is measured through research funding allocations. One plausible
interpretation of these results is that the REF affects departments primarily through establishing an
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objective measure of reputation (GPA score) and not as much through funding. Thus the vaunted
government policy of rewarding excellence, by steering funding heavily where “world leading”
research is carried out is partially undone by the universities’ central administrations, which appear
to allocate more senior posts according to the simpler GPA measure. In other words, the research
evaluation exercise seems to create a measure of research quality, and departments which perform
strongly in terms of research quality are rewarded with higher wages and new senior posts.
Both the theoretical model and the empirical analysis link average pay and research performance
at the department level. As a result, the focus of our study differs from that in the relatively more
established literature linking individual’s compensation and their research productivity, where great
attention has been dedicated to the challenging task of measuring an academic’s output. The early
work by Diamond (1986) uses citations as an indicator of a researcher’s impact, and finds that the
marginal effect of an additional citation on individual income is positive. Other contributions
distinguish between the number of citations, used as a proxy for “quality”, and the measure of
“quantity” given by the number of papers published. Most analyses study a small sample of
departments (e.g. Hamermesh et al. 1982, Moore et al. 1998 and Bratsberg et al. 2010). In a recent
paper, Hamermesh and Pfann (2012) consider instead the members of a larger group of 43 economics
department at public institutions in the United States, and find a positive association between output
and salaries. This holds both when output is measured by quality, proxied by citations, or by
quantity, the number of papers. As far as we know, Sgroi and Oswald (2013) is the only paper which
provides a solid theoretical foundation to the balance between quality and quantity. The paucity of
information on individual pay has constrained the analysis of the previous incarnations of the REF.2
A small recent strand of this literature studies the determinants of individuals’ research output in
continental Europe: among these, Bosquet and Combes (2017), Zinovyeva and Bagues (2010, 2015) and
Checchi et al. (2014) in France, Spain, and Italy, respectively. The first of these studies shows that the
characteristics of colleagues matter for research, while the last two focus on the link between research
performance and the chances of promotion. In a recent contribution Kwiek (2017), on the other hand,
shows how in continental Europe salary increases are associated with increases in administrative and
managerial duties.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. To frame our analysis, we present in Section 2 a simple
theoretical model of resource allocation within universities that we use to interpret our empirical
results. The main features of the REF and the data used in the analysis are described in Section 3.
Our empirical results are presented in Sections 4, 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes. Additional results and
more information on the UK university sector are available in the Appendix.
2Early comprehensive studies (e.g. Johnes et al. 1993, Taylor 1995, Sharp and Coleman 2005) have emphasised the role
played by systematic biases in the panels’ quality assessment, based on characteristics of the institutions: new universities
vs. more established ones, institutions based in England vs. those based in other parts of the country, units of assessment that
had a panel member vs. those which did not, and so on. Controlling for the quality of the submission in the 1996 and 2001
assessments of economics and econometrics departments, Clerides et al. (2011) do not find systematic evidence of biases in
favour of specific institutions. The exception is membership in the assessment panel, which has a positive and significant
impact on the ranking of the department in the 1996 exercise. This is in line, as well as with this paper, with Butler and
McAllister’s (2009) study of the evaluation of the political science panel in the 2001 exercise. The important role played by
the panel composition on the evaluation process of academics has been emphasised also by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015)
for the case of Spain.
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2 A Model of Research Evaluation and University Competition
Boxes 1 and 2 present a simple theoretical model which illustrates how the incentives created by the
research evaluation exercise may shape the pay structure within a university’s academic departments.
While other models of the university sector are of course possible, we build one that allows us to
focus on the effects of the competition induced by the REF, and so we concentrate on the production
of research, abstracting, in particular, from explicitly including teaching. Any constraint imposed by
teaching, such as the requirement to recruit a given number of students, is implicitly captured in the
production function or in the budget constraint.
In our simple model, research output is generated by different units within a university, the
departments. All units employ capital and two types of academics (good and excellent professors),
and they may differ in their “technology”, captured by the extent of the complementarity between
the three inputs, capital and the two types of labour. Universities allocate their budget across
different departments in order to maximise a weighted average of the research outputs of all their
departments3 and receive transfers from the government which depend on the research performance
of each unit. Capital is elastically supplied, and we capture the scarcity of academic labour with a
simple reduced form supply function, inelastic for both types of labour, but, naturally, more so for
more skilled academics. With this model, we determine the wage structure of each department and
the allocation of funds across departments in each state financed university.
We begin, in Box 1, by studying the problem faced by a department which needs to allocate the
budget it receives from the central administration of the university. Lemma 1 in Box 1 indicates that,
in the long run, the industry equilibrium is such that the amount of both capital and labour
employed by a department increase with the budget allocated to it, whereas the amount of labour
(capital) employed declines (increases) with the importance of capital in the production process. This
latter parameter influences research output in unexpected ways: small departments become smaller
still as capital intensity increases, whereas large ones instead increase further in size. This tallies with
the anecdotal observation that capital intensive departments tend to be large.4
Expression (9) in Lemma 2 is standard for models where labour supply is inelastic. Expression
(10) shows that the mean salary and the dispersion of salaries within a department are collinear, and
Proposition 1 shows that they both increase with the budget allocated to the department, and with the
importance of labour in the production process of research. Intuitively, the mean increases because
of the realistic assumption that the labour supply is not perfectly elastic. As labour becomes more
valuable, for example because the university allocates more funding to the department, or because
capital becomes less important, the department will want to hire more academics of both types, and
supply being inelastic, will need to pay more for it.
3While a large body of literature emphasises the role played by conflicts of interest within large institutions (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992), in the case of universities it is plausible to assume that individual academics and the heads of both
universities and departments all share the same goal with regards to research, namely the maximisation of its quality.
4This follows from the fact that the sign of the derivative of output with respect to the parameter βi is the same as the
sign of ln 2βi Bicir : therefore it is negative when the budget is low, but it becomes positive for a large enough budget.
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BOX 1 The department optimisation problem
We model the higher education sector as a quasi-market comprising K universities, indexed by
k = 1, . . . , K. They aim to maximise an aggregate measure of their research output in the n
academic disciplines, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n.
Research is produced using three inputs: capital and two types of labour, for example, good
professors and superstar academics. Let w` be the salary of an academic of type ` and assume
that the supply of this type of professors is given by a
L` = µ`w`, ` = 1, 2, (1)
where L` is the amount of labour of type `, with ` = 1, 2. The parameter µ` in the supply
function of the two types of labour captures plausibly different job market opportunities for
the two types of academics, which depend on their research potential. The research outputb
of university k in discipline i, k = 1, . . . , K, i = 1, . . . , n, is denoted by ρk,i, and obeys a
Cobb-Douglas technology, a simplified special case of the functions typically used in empirical







where S is the stock of capital, given by labs, equipment, technical personnel, and so on: this
can be purchased in a competitive market at a price r.
The parameters θk and βi correspond to fixed effects in our empirical specification. They
characterise respectively the overall research productivity of an institution, due for example to
different research environments and international connections,c and the importance of capital
in a given discipline, which depends on factors such as laboratory costs and the like.
If a given department i receives a fixed budget Bi from university k central administration, its
budget constraint is given by:
rS + w1L1 + w2L2 = Bi. (3)
Thus department i in institution k chooses S, L1 and L2 to maximise (2) subject to (1) and (3). To
lighten notation, let
aWe therefore ignore any oligopsonistic interaction among institutions: taking them into account would change
the absolute levels of academic employment and salaries, but would not alter their relative values across institutions
and disciplines, which is the focus of our paper.
bWe do not specify how research output is measured. It could be one of the REF measures considered below,
(19) or (20), but the model could be applied to a world without REF, and research output is the less mechanically
defined prestige and reputation that is fed and maintained by prizes, accolades, publications, policy influence, and
any distinction that enhances academic esteem.
cWe take θk to be exogenously given: it may depend on reputation, history or location, and in particular, it is not
affected by changes in the quality of other departments. Thus our analysis is based on the idea that the correlation
between the quality of the various departments in a given university is not a necessary consequence of technological
spillovers, but may be caused by an unobserved factor, common to all departments. A similar set-up emerges if θk
is interpreted as a measure of the cost of doing research, and if the plausible assumption is made that academics
are willing to trade-off a university’s prestige and overall research environment for a lower salary (see De Fraja and
Valbonesi (2012), or De Fraja (2016)). If this is the case a prestigious university would find it easier to hire and retain




















ci = α1 + α2 + 2βi. (5)
We can now establish the following:












and the research output is given by







The wage structure of the department is instead characterized in the following:
Lemma 2. At the solution of department i’s maximisation problem the salaries for the two types of





, ` = 1, 2. (9)




































The proof of this and the other results can be found in the Appendix. The following is an
immediate consequence of the previous result.
Proposition 1. The derivatives of the mean salary and of the standard deviation of salary in department










i < 0, when differentiating




i > 0 when differentiating with respect to Bi.
6
The increase in the standard deviation requires the additional hypothesis that the ratio αlµl is
different for the two types of labour, so that the
∣∣∣√ α1µ1 −√ α2µ2 ∣∣∣ in (10) is non-zero.5 As long as the two
types of labor have different efficiency adjusted costs, as the size of the department increases, so does
the wedge between the total compensation of the two groups of workers, and hence the measured
standard deviation of departmental salaries. While the exact values of individual wages, aggregate
wages and of the Gini coefficient in (9)-(11) does depend on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
technology, the informal discussion in this paragraph suggests that the relationships highlighted in
Proposition 1 will hold more generally, when at least some workers are paid above their marginal
productivity.6
Given that, ceteris paribus, a department’s research output increases with its budget, the model
predicts a positive association in the steady-state equilibrium between average salary and research
output and between inequality in salary and research output, which is consistent with the main
findings of our empirical analysis. Conversely, the mean and the standard deviation of the
department salaries varies in the opposite direction to capital intensity. The intuition for this effect is
the same as for size: an increase in β reduces the importance of labour in production, and so, for a
given budget, fewer workers will be employed.7
Corollary 1 in Box 2 implies that, in the steady state, universities with a higher ability to do
research, measured by θk in the model, will be able to devote more resources to all their departments,
which will also produce higher output. In other words, in equilibrium, research output and the pay
structure of each department in every institution are simultaneously determined by the common
technology, captured by the parameters α1, α2, and βi, with a ranking of institutions determined
instead by the unobservable idiosyncratic parameter θk. This ranking suggests that some institutions
will tend to perform better in all disciplines, and pay their professors more.8 As a result, our model
can explain the empirical pattern that some groups of universities tend to perform better in the
research evaluation across (nearly) all disciplines – for example the Russell Group in the UK context.
5Note that it is theoretically conceivable that the lower productivity workers are paid more. For this to happen, however,
their supply must be sufficiently more inelastic than that of higher productivity workers to compensate for their lower
productivity. This seems unrealistic though, as in all plausible situations the supply of superstar professors is likely to be
less elastic than that of the good professors.
6Given the simplified Cobb-Douglas technology we consider here, the Gini coefficient (11) is independent of the
department budget and hence size, but depends only on the relative productivities and the relative elasticities of the two
types of academics. This result would not hold in a richer model.
7To the extent that STEM subjects are more capital intensive than social sciences and humanities, this constitutes a testable
implication of this model.
8The model in the box, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, and the condition on the productivity of capital,
rules out corner solutions where some universities close down some departments. A more flexible production function, and
explicit inclusion of general equilibrium effects might generate specialisation of different universities in different disciplines.
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BOX 2 The university maximisation problem
We now consider the university’s allocation problem. We make the following assumptions
regarding the objective function and the resources a university has at its disposal.





uiρ∗k,i (Bi) , k = 1, . . . , K. (12)
That is, university k aims at maximising the total weighted research output of all its
departments, with exogenously given weights, ui. This is a catch-all simplifying assumption
to capture the idea that universities care about research success.a
The next assumption establishes a link between research success and the overall budget made
available by the funding agency to university k, which is denoted by B̄k. While these budgets
are in practice allocated each year on the basis of past success, we can think of the simultaneous
set-up presented here as the steady state.







k,i (Bi) . (13)
The weights γi are exogenously given, fixed by the government agency in charge of university
funding. A linear formulation is a very natural starting point for the analysis, and was used
in the 2014 REF (see (20) in Box 3 below), when the government rewarded excellence by
skewing the measure of performance strongly towards high quality outputs, but the sum of
the funding of two departments would not be altered by their merging. This seems a desirable
property. Incorporating external sources of revenues, such as sponsorships, grant funding,
income from patents or donations from alumni, would not alter the analytical set-up, as all
these are positively related to prestige. Note furthermore that the funding weights γi depend
on institutional differences, and will not in general be proportional to the utility weights in (12),
ui.b
aA more complex model could modify (12) replacing the weighted sum with a more general function of the
research performance to fit better the details of the REF, for example the GPA score and the funding formula in (19)
and (20) in Box 3 in Section 3.1. The idea of (12) is that the university’s management aims at maximising overall
prestige, given by a weighted average of the prestige of its activities, and that funding raised in any way, including
the government research allocation, is devoted to enhance research prowess. The simple formulation in (12) conveys
the main idea of the model. It could be extended, with no conceptually important changes, for example, by making
the payoff depending on an institution’s rank in each discipline, rather than the level of its output, or including an
exponent for the output. The latter would capture an institution’s preference for equality or inequality, according to
whether the exponent is smaller or greater than 1.
bNote also that in the special case where the ratio between ui and γi is constant in i, that is when the relative
“prestige” of any two disciplines equals their relative funding, the Lagrange multiplier disappears from the budget
allocation (16). That is, in this case, and only in this case, all departments in a given university grow and shrink
proportionally according to its funding.
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We can now determine the allocation of funds to the departments.
Corollary 1. Let βi < 1− α1+α22 . Then there exists a λk > 0, such that the solution of university k’s
problem is given by:
Bi = ci
[
(ui + λkγi) Aiθk
2λk
]1− ci2
, i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
The condition in the statement of the corollary ensures that all departments receive a positive
share of the total funds, and it avoids the need to consider corner solutions, where some
departments are shut down. Finally, note that to close the model, (16) is substituted into (15) to
obtain λk as a function of the βi’s and θk, and the other parameters, which are constant across
disciplines and institutions. Writing this as λ (θk; β), where β = (β1, . . . , βn), we can determine
the research output of each discipline as a function of the exogenous parameters:c
















cNote that it is not practical to obtain explicit expressions for ρ∗k,i, as it is highly non-linear in the parameters. For
example, an increase in the capital-intensity of a discipline, measured by βi, first increases the research performance
then decreases it, due to the increase in cost and the beneficial effect of diverting resources to other “less expensive”
disciplines.
3 Data
Our dataset combines public information on the submissions and results from the REF, available on
the REF 2014 website, with repeated cross-section data containing information on the characteristics
of all full professors in UK academic departments. With these data, we can identify the characteristics
of the professorial wage structure at the point of the REF exercise (October 2013) and then track the
evolution of the wage structure over subsequent years.9 In this section we start by presenting the
institutional environment of the REF, we discuss next the sample construction, and we report some
summary statistics.
9Note though that the data do not contain individual level identifiers and as a result we cannot construct an individual
professor level panel.
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3.1 Research Excellence Framework (REF) Outcome Data
The REF 2014 was a government run evaluation to assess the quality of research in UK higher
education institutions.10 As well as ensuring accountability for public investment in research and
producing evidence of its benefits, the assessment informs the selective allocation of the annual
“block” budget for research to institutions. This funding is the so-called QR (quality related)
allocation, and, unlike the funds distributed by the research councils, which pay for specific projects,
universities are free to choose how to allocate them across projects, and indeed disciplines. The
funding allocated on the basis of REF results is approximately one quarter of all taxpayer money
awarded to higher education institutions.11
Do UK universities place greater emphasis on their GPA or funding scores? Institutions are not
required to submit all their academics; instead they may choose whom to submit for assessment.12
The presence of Ni in (20), but not in (19), thus creates for them an important trade-off. GPA, for its
immediacy and simplicity is a good measure of prestige, used in many league tables. If institutions
only care about GPA, then they should submit very few researchers, in the limit only their very best
ones. This however would harm their funding, which is proportional to the number of staff
submitted for assessment. While we report results for funding scores in the main text we repeat all
our estimations using GPA as the dependent variable and report them in the Appendix.
It is important to note that the funding determined by formula (20) in Box 3 is calculated by
department, but allocated to the university and that the outcome of the REF exercise determines the
funding received by the university in every year until the subsequent assessment is carried out. As a
result, while the contribution to the university budget of each of its departments can be measured
down to the last penny, universities are not required to allocate these funds to the departments
responsible for obtaining them.
The three components of the quality indicator generate different incentives in recruitment and
retention of academics. These differences can be used to understand how does the “transfer market”
for academics operate, given the different incentives provided to departments to hire academics with
an excellent publication record or who have carried out research with very strong impact (see Box 3).
As we explain, an academic’s output is portable across institutions, but the value of her contribution
to the environment and especially her impact is not. This suggests that, when hiring or responding to
outside offers prior to the REF census date, institutions should value more a researcher with a stellar
publication record, even though she has no demonstrable impact outside academia, than a researcher
whose less prestigious recent publications can however be shown to have influenced a certain Act of
Parliament, an EU directive, or industry practice.
10Similar exercises have been carried out at regular intervals since 1992, with early runs in 1986 and 1989, as explained on
the REF website.
11For an overview of the sources of University revenues in the UK, see https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/
policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/university-funding-explained.aspx. Detailed information of how
public funds are allocated to UK universities can be found at www.hesa.ac.uk/stats-finance. The full set of REF
rules, the identity of the reviewers, and the outcomes are all available at www.ref.ac.uk.
12For the next exercise, REF 2021, this element is being removed. Departments will be required to submit all of their
professors with responsibility for research
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BOX 3: The 2014 Research Excellence Framework
As a result of the evaluation, each academic department is assigned a numerical ‘quality’ profile
which describes the percentage of the department’s output, environment and impact rated on
a 5-point “star” scale from 4* to 0*, where 4* is defined as “Quality that is world-leading in
terms of originality, significance and rigour” and 0* is “Quality that falls below the standard
of nationally recognised work.”a The profiles of the three components (output, impact and
environment) are aggregated into a single quality profile, given by a weighted average of the
three components, with weights 65%, 20%, and 15% for the three components.
Formally, let πsik be the proportion of the submission department i’ in university k judged to be












ik are the shares of department i in university k’s research output, impact
and environment which has been attributed a grade s? by the panel. Clearly ∑4s=0 Osik = 1, and
similarly for Isik and E
s
ik and hence for π
s
ik.
The REF involves peer-review assessment by 36 subject-specific expert panels of the ”reach and
significance” of the research carried out by the academics submitted for assessment. The 36
panels are grouped into four “Main Panels”, corresponding to very broad disciplinary areas:
medicine and biology, the other sciences and engineering, the social sciences, and the arts and
humanities. Universities are not obliged to submit all their departments for evaluation, nor
are they compelled to submit all the academic members of each department submitted. By not
doing so though they might forgo part of their funding, which is based on a formula weakly
increasing in the number of academics submitted. This is an important difference with the
previous exercises, where the funding was proportional to the product of the number of FTE
staff submitted and the average quality of their research: thus submitting an additional, weak,
researcher could have lowered the department average and hence the funding as well as the
prestige.b
As already mentioned, panels assess academic departments in three areas: research output,
environment, and impact. Output is assessed through the evaluation of scholarly work (such as
books or journal articles), published in the period since the previous assessment. Each academic
submitted is required to submit four different items.c An academic’s outputs are attributed to
the institution where she is employed on 31 October 2013, the REF census date, even if they
were produced while the faculty member was employed by a different institution.
aA tongue-in-cheek analysis of the accuracy of these definitions is carried out in the intriguing paper by Règibeau
and Rockett (2016).
bThe change to the funding formula for the 2014 exercise described in detail in (20) was intended to soften
the trade-off, and induce universities to submit all their research staff. Anecdotal evidence suggests however that
the desired effect was not achieved, and rules have changed again for the next exercise when all staff involved in
research will have to be submitted.
cHamermesh and Pfann (2012) find a negative correlation between the number of citations and the number of
papers published by the members of a sample of top US economics departments. Thus the small number of items
individuals are required to submit for the REF, might indicate that the UK policy maker preferences are skewed
towards the “quality” of research, measured by citations, rather than the sheer publication count.
11
The environment component is a written submission describing the achievements of the
academic department, together with data on research grant income and PhD completions.
Similarly, impact is assessed by considering written ‘case studies’, one for every eight
academics submitted, accompanied by supporting evidence which shows how the research
of the department has brought benefits outside of academia through, for example, influence on
government policy or industry practice. Unlike output, impact is attributed to the institution
where it was carried out irrespective of which institution is currently employing the researcher
responsible for it at the census date.d Similarly, it would be hard for a department to argue
that someone with a very short tenure could have had the opportunity to affect its research
“environment”. That is, the “output” component is transferable, while the “environment” and
“impact” components are not.
The quality profiles of individual departments presented in equation (18) are typically used
to construct two indicators. The first is the grade point average, GPA, which has a limited
official status, but is widely used by the media and in the public discourse to rank departments
in national league tables. GPA is calculated as a weighted average of the scores, with the






The second indicator is a funding score formula, FS, which is used by the government as the
basis to determine research funding allocations. This formula is intended to provide incentives
towards high quality research, and so it gives high weight to 4? output, and no weight to
output judged less than 3?.e With the above notation, and Ni denoting the number of full–
time equivalent researchers submitted by department i, its yearly funding until the following








where Φt is the QR unit funding, determined every year t depending on the overall public
funding for universities, and Γi is a subject specific weight which takes the value 1.6 for STEM
subjects, 1.3 for intermediate cost subjects such as geography, architecture, sport sciences,
design, music and 1 for all other subjects.
dTo use a fictitious example, suppose Professor Lapping publishes important papers while he is employed by
Poppleton University. He then moves to Porterhouse College before the REF census date. Then his publications
will be included in the “output” submission of Porterhouse College and in the “impact” submission of Poppleton
University.
eWhile institutions did not know the exact details of the formula, which were determined after the publication
of the results (Else 2015), they knew the principles which would underpin it.
3.2 Sample Construction
To construct our sample we combine data on academic department–level results from the REF 2014
exercise with repeated cross-sections of salary data containing details of professorial pay within
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departments. The salary data is at the individual level as a repeated cross-section dataset provided
by the UK Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) for the years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16. It
covers the universe of all individuals employed with the academic rank of full professor by a higher
education institution.13 This allows us to observe pay within departments at the point of the REF
census date (October 2013) and track it subsequently over the following two years; however, as we
do not have an individual identifier we cannot construct an individual-level panel. In total there are
approximately 17, 000 full-time equivalent professorial positions in the UK which are filled by
approximately 19, 000 individuals, some of whom work part-time. HESA matches each individual to
one of the 36 REF panels, and therefore we use the composition of departments determined by this
match, even if there may be instances in which an individual in a given department is submitted to a
different panel for assessment (for example, an economics member of staff might have been
submitted to the management panel). Information about the average pay and its dispersion within a
department is obtained from this data, which also reports details of the age structure of departments’
professoriate: for each department, we know the fraction of professors whose age falls in each
ten-year band.
From these matched data we calculate various departmental level characteristics of the wage
structure, such as mean wages and measures of wage inequality. When constructing these measures
we introduce some minor sample restrictions. First, we include only professors paid a full-time
equivalent of more than a threshold value of £50, 500 in 2013.14 To reduce the possibility of
identifying individuals, the sample is limited to units with more than three full-time equivalent
professors, and we exclude units which were not submitted to the REF. We also omit the only
department of the London Business School that has very low reliance on government funding and is
an extreme outlier, in regards of salaries, as it pays on average considerably more than the national
average. Together these restrictions reduce our sample from approximately 17, 000 full-time
equivalent full professors to 16, 300. The final piece of information we add is the total remuneration
of the universities’ heads, typically known as Vice Chancellors, which is published every year in the
Times Higher Education newspaper.
Departments are partitioned into the four ”Main Panels” defined by the REF exercise. We also
divide universities into five groups, according to their institutional characteristics. These are the most
established universities, which include the original Russell group, labelled “Russell” – Oxbridge, LSE,
and the authors’ institution among them; the founding members of the recently disbanded “1994
group”, which comprised younger and smaller research-intensive universities, – York, Essex, Queen
Mary among them; “New Universities” mostly created from locally controlled vocational institutions;
“specialist” institutions, such as the Royal College of Arts, whose focus is exclusively on a single
discipline; and the rest, mostly universities with historically less emphasis on research (such as Hull,
13Currently, the standard UK academic hierarchy comprises three grades, with the conventional titles of assistant,
associate and full professor. With few exceptions, all institutions pay staff on the first two levels according to nationally
agreed, relatively short, scales, and so salary and tenure in the post are highly correlated. Individual negotiation, on the
other hand, is the norm for full professors, and for this reason we focus on the pay structure among them only.
14This is to account for the fact that in some institutions there are academics who are paid a very low full-time equivalent
annual pay, and are employed for a very small fraction of the time (a typical figure is 10%). Our understanding is that some
institutions classify as professorial staff collaborators (such as external examiners) who would be considered external payees
in other institutions, and whose research cannot be submitted to the REF evaluation. All our results are robust if we include
also professors paid less than the threshold.
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Bradford), labelled “Others”. A full listing of the groups is provided in the Appendix A.
3.3 Summary Statistics
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Summary data on the characteristics of the 1, 093 academic departments that comprise our final
dataset are reported in Table 1. The average department has approximately 14 full professors (Full-
Time Equivalent, FTE), with an average pay at around £74,000. The number of professorial FTE in
a department ranges from 3 to over 300: the latter figure applying to a very large medical school.
Average salary ranges from just above £50,000 to just below £130,000. The Gini coefficient for the
department’s professorial pay is on average low at 8 percent, but varies between zero (completely
equal pay) to 36 percent.15 Notice that, given the minimum pay constraint, the maximum theoretical
value for the department with the country’s average membership and pay is around 30 percent. Over
two thirds of professors fall in the 41–60 age range. The table also includes summary data for the
total number of full-time equivalent staff, including non-professors, submitted to the REF, the pay of
the university Vice Chancellor, and a dummy indicating whether a member of academic staff from
the department sat on the REF peer-review panel. We use these variables as controls in our analysis.
Table 2 summarises the same time-varying variables from Table 1 two years after the REF exercise. In
Table 3 we show summary statistics for the changes in these variables across the two waves of data.
Table 4 summarises the performance of departments in the REF exercise. A breakdown of average
scores across the full quality profile is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
The distribution of average departmental salary and of REF funding scores is shown in Figure 1.
Departments are grouped according to the REF main panel which evaluated them (on the LHS plots),
and by the type of their university (on the RHS plots). The top plots in Figure 1 illustrate a right-tail of
high paying departments across panels and university types, with more pronounced skewness in the
social sciences and specialist universities. The distributions of funding scores, shown in the bottom
plots, are similar across panels, with a higher average among the medicine panel due to the typically
large size of medical schools. For this and other reasons, we repeat in the appendix the analysis
excluding all the department in the “Clinical Medicine” unit of assessment. Plot D shows variation
in performance across university types, suggesting a hierarchical ranking with the Russell group of
universities on average the strongest performers, followed by the “1994” group, the “Others” and the
15Academic pay dispersion has grabbed little attention; exception are studies of inequalities due to sex and race. See for
example Porter et al. (2008). In our analysis we use the Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality. Other measures, such
as the natural log of the standard deviation of salaries in the unit, or the variance of the natural log of salaries in the unit,
produce very similar results. By construction, these alternative measures of inequality are highly correlated with the Gini
coefficient. Results are available from the authors on request.
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“New Universities”. Table 5 shows the correlation matrix across the different measures of research
performance we consider in our study. Note that the correlations between the GPA score and its
components are well below 1, indicating that the panels do judge each component separately.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 illustrates the unconditional correlation between our main variables of interest: average
departmental pay and funding score. It shows a positive average pay-performance gradient across
subject areas and university types. The slopes of the fitted regression lines are similar across main
panels, but less so across university types: the fitted line has a lower gradient in the Russell group
universities and is steepest in the “New Universities”.
4 Results: Equilibrium prior to the REF
Universities knew the REF rules well in advance of the submission, and therefore had the opportunity
to allocate funding to departments according to their objective function. The relationship between
departmental pay structures at the point of the REF evaluation (October 2013) and departmental REF
performance presented in this section therefore corresponds loosely to the steady-state of the model
introduced in Section 2. The aim is to uncover the association between pay and performance. To this
end, we estimate a series of econometric models taking the following general form:
RPik = β0 + β1AvSalaryik + β2Giniik + β3Xik + φi + ψt + εik, (21)
where RPik is a measure of REF performance for the submission made by university k, which is of
university type t (i.e. “Russell”, “1994 group” etc.), to the panel assessing disciplinary field i. In the
main analysis the REF outcome is the natural log of the funding score, and in the appendix we report
also results for the determinants of the overall GPA. The results obtained using the two dependent
variables are qualitatively very similar (see Figures A1 and A2, Tables A2, and A3 in the Appendix).
AvSalaryik and Giniik are the average salary in October 2013 of the professoriate in department
(i, k), in logs, and inequality in department (i, k), measured by the Gini coefficient of the professors’
salaries.16 The matrix Xik contains additional controls including the total number of professorial full
time equivalents (FTE), the total number of FTE members of staff submitted to the REF (both in logs),
an indicator for whether the department had a member of staff serving on the corresponding REF
panel, the total remuneration of the university’s head (in logs), and the share of individuals in the
professoriate who are respectively below 40 years of age, between 41 and 50 years of age, and between
51-60 years of age, with the professors older than 60 as the reference group. In some specifications we
16An alternative measure of pay inequality within a department is given by the variance of log salary, which has a
correlation coefficient with the Gini measure of 0.93. Results using this alternative measure are very similar and available
upon request.
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also include discipline (φi, i = 1, . . . , 36) and institution type (ψt, t = 1, . . . , 5) fixed effects to account
respectively for unobserved characteristics common to all departments in the same subject and to
departments in similar institutions. The large number of institutions, and the fact that many of them
submitted very few departments, often only one or two, prevents us from including institution fixed
effects. Finally, εik is the error term.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
Table 6 presents the main results of this section. Column (1) shows estimates from a specification
where regressors are average salary and inequality and where we control for a basic set of covariates.
Results indicate that the size of the submission, measured by the total number of academic staff, thus
including non-professors, improves REF performance.17 At the same time, the additional effect of
submitting professors rather than less senior staff is only weakly statistically significant. Moreover,
we find that having a member of staff on the corresponding REF panel has a positive and significant
effect on the REF funding score. There is also a positive association between REF performance and the
university head’s total compensation (see Figure A3 in the Appendix for more details).
In Columns (2) and (3) we additionally include unit of assessment and institution type fixed
effects. This improves further the fit of the models, from an already very high value of 0.87, to over
90%. In both specifications the average wage and the measure of inequality keep a robust link with
REF performance, though their coefficient is lowered in value and inequality is less precisely
estimated when we include the institution type fixed effect.
The magnitude of the effects we have uncovered is substantial. The results in our preferred
specification, Column (3), indicate that a 10% increase in average salary is associated with a 5.1%
increase in the REF funding. Though less precisely estimated, the coefficient for the Gini coefficient
of the professorial salary is also sizeable: if the coefficient grows from 8.2 (the sample average) to 9, a
10% increase, the funding score increases by 5.7%. There is also a strong size effect: a 10% increase in
the size of the total REF submission is associated to a 10.5% increase in REF funding: if two identical
departments, both with all co-variates equal to the sample mean, were to merge, their aggregate REF
funding would increase by 6.4%. Note that if departments where solely concerned with total
funding, they would submit as many staff as possible, given that, at the census date, an academic’s
salary is effectively a sunk cost. A positive coefficient might therefore indicate that some
departments are constrained in the number of people they submit, as they already submit everyone,
or because it is not the case that they care only about funding.18 On the other hand, the analysis of
Section 6 suggests that, indeed, universities are willing to trade-off prestige against funding. The
additional effect of a 10% increase in the number of professorial FTE employed, keeping the overall
size constant, is a modest 1.1% increase in the REF funding. Having a member of the department on
the evaluation panel increases instead the funding score by 6%: arguably a non-negligible effect.
17One feature of the REF is that departments are allowed to hire academics on a part-time basis (subject to a minimum
threshold of 0.2 FTE) and include the academic’s papers in their REF submission. We cannot perfectly identify the number of
part-time staff in the HESA data, which is recoded at the FTE level. For example, two professors in the same age bracket who
are both paid the same salary would be recorded in the HESA data a 1 × FTE. However, when we include the proportion of
observable part-time staff as a control variable, results are unchanged. See Tables A7 and A8 for details.
18An empirical analysis of this point is not possible, as HESA does not collect data on submittable FTE.
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Finally, age seems to matter little: while the coefficient for under 40 is significant19 only few
professors are under 40. We find very similar results when GPA score is used as the dependent
variable; see Table A2 in the Appendix.
The analysis of the unit of assessment fixed effect coefficients offers us an insight on systematic
differences across fields that are not captured by our observables. Figure 3 displays plots of these fixed
effects with 95% confidence intervals, taking as baseline the Economics and Econometrics panel. To
gain insights on the magnitude of these effects, a department in the discipline with the highest fixed
effect (Sports Science or Communications and Media Studies) would receive approximately twice20
the annual funding than an otherwise identical department in the discipline with the lowest estimated
fixed effect (Economics and Econometrics).
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
This lower REF success on average of the Economics and Econometrics UK departments could
be due either to a lower “quality” of the average submission in the field, or to a more “demanding”
assessment of research by this panel’s members, and our data are unable to shed any light on which
of these alternative explanations is more likely. Using a methodology which measures quality as
the number of citations attracted by papers published in high quality journals, Oswald (2015) argues
however that the quality of UK economics is high.
4.1 Results by Subject Groups and University Types
Given the existence of a strong positive relationship between average professorial wage and REF
performance uncovered by the empirical analysis so far, one important question is whether the shape
of this relationship varies across fields. We therefore estimate the specification of Column (1) in Table
6, separately for sub-samples corresponding to the four main REF panels, including university type
fixed effects. As Table 7 shows, the effect of average salary is positive and statistically significant for
all panels. It is considerably larger in the main panel A (medicine and biology), than in the other
subject areas: all the coefficients are pairwise statistically significantly different, except the difference
between main panels B and D, whose equality is only weakly rejected, with a p-value of 0.0914.21
The difference across main panels conceals some heterogeneity among the disciplines that make
up the four groups. Figure 4 plots the coefficient estimates for the average professorial wage, with
95% confidence intervals shown in bars, from the same model specification as in Column (1) of Table
6, run separately in each of the 36 subjects corresponding to the units of assessment.22
19The average department has 14.4 members, so replacing an over 40 professor with a younger one increases the number
of under 40 professors by 6.94%. Given a coefficient of 0.222, ceteris paribus this swap increases the funding score by 1.5%.
20In a regression of ln Y on covariates, if a dummy variable switches from 0 to 1, the percentage effect on Y is 100 (ec − 1),
where c is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable. See Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Giles (1982) for details.
21Note that the independent role of the inequality in wages in the overall sample appears to be driven by the disciplines
in main panel B, science and engineering and A, medicine. The coefficients on our measure of inequality for the other main
panels are both smaller and not estimated precisely. Furthermore, the effect of having a panel member uncovered in Table
6 is less statistically significant and smaller in value for medicine and biology than for the social sciences and the arts and
humanities. Again the GPA score as the measure of research performance yields qualitatively very similar results (Table A3
in the Appendix).
22Note the very high coefficient for Clinical Medicine. This, and the fact that a large proportion of the academics employed
in these departments work also for, and are separately paid by, the National Health Service, implies that their salary structure
might well be driven by different considerations. Given the large number of professors in this unit of assessment (15.5% of
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[Insert Table 7 about here.]
[Insert Table 8 about here.]
In Table 8 we run the same specification as in Column (3) of Table 6 on four different subgroups
of institutions: the “Russell group”, the “1994 group”, the “New Universities” and the “Others” (we
omit specialist universities as they comprise a total of only eight departments). We find that the
relationship between average professorial wage and REF performance becomes progressively stronger
as we move from the “Russell group” institutions to the “New universities”, roughly following the
quality of research, as depicted in Figure 2, Panel (B). 23
4.2 Results by Score Components
As we explained in Section 3.1 the overall research profile of a unit is obtained as a weighted average
of the profiles in each of the three components of the assessment: outputs, environment, and impact.
While output can easily be transferred across departments by hiring the academic who has produced
it, this is not the case for environment and impact. Thus we expect that if universities use higher
salaries to improve their REF performance, the effect of salaries should be stronger on the measure of
output than on the other components of the overall funding score. To assess this idea, in Table 9 we
run the specification from Column (3) of Table 6, which includes unit and institution type fixed effects,
and is reported for convenience in Column (1) of Table 9, three more times, each with only one of the
separate components of the overall REF funding score as dependent variables.
[Insert Table 9 about here.]
These results are presented in Columns (2)-(4). The overall positive association between average
salary and REF performance is driven primarily by the relationships between salary and output and
between salary and environment funding score. There is weaker evidence for a positive relationship
between average salary and impact funding score, which is consistent with the rules of the REF which
are such that institutions cannot “buy-in” impact success.24 We find that having a member of staff on
the panel has a positive and statistically significant effect on the funding score obtained for research
environment and impact. There is no significant effect instead on the output funding score. These
results are consistent with the idea that panel membership might be more important for the elements
of the REF evaluation that are arguably more subjective, rather than for those which are based on more
objective criteria such as the reputation of the outlet where a scholarly work has been published, its
impact factor or the number of citations received.
the total), we are re-assured that the results are unaffected when we exclude all the departments submitted to the Clinical
Medicine unit of assessment (Table A4 in the Appendix).
23This result holds true also when we exclude from our analysis Cambridge and Oxford, two institutions that offer
substantial non-monetary compensation to many senior academics, for example in the form of subsidised accommodation.
24Cross-model tests of the equality of the coefficients on average salary in the model for output (2) against the model
for impact (4), and also the model for environment (3) against the model for impact (4), in both cases reject the equality of
coefficients at the 5% level. Note also that larger departments, those with more professors, especially those aged under 40,
and those where pay inequality is higher do better in the environment component.
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5 Responses to the REF: Empirical Strategy
Did the outcome of the REF exercise affect the subsequent wage structure of individual departments?
In this section, we exploit a feature of the REF evaluation that allows us to assess the effects of REF
performance on subsequent changes in the wage structure at the department level. As pointed out in
Box 3, the funding formula (20) translates a department’s quality profile – the percentage of activity
evaluated to be of quality at 4*, 3*, 2*, 1*, and 0* – into the level of funding received. Importantly, the
funding formula adopts a different set of weights compared to the headline measure of success given
by the GPA used in the media. In particular, the former heavily over-weights 4* research relative to
the GPA, as it can be evinced by comparing equations (20) and (19). As a result, two departments of
the same average quality (GPA) submitting the same number of academics can well receive different
levels of funding. More precisely, a department which achieves a given GPA score with more research
evaluated as 4* will receive higher funding than a department achieving the same GPA with a lower
percentage of research evaluated as 4*.25 The non-linearity in the funding formula implies also that,
symmetrically, two departments receiving the same level of funding could well be characterized by
different GPA scores.
Using these features of the REF, we compare two mirror approaches: the first matches GPAs
(and size and broad subject area) to determine whether differences in funding generate corresponding
changes in the pay structure, and the second approach matches funding (and broad subject area only,
as the funding score already accounts for size) to study if differences in GPA determine corresponding
changes in the pay structure. These estimates provide evidence of how universities respond to REF
performance.26
Importantly, the two exercises allow us to shed light on different implications of the REF for each
university. Strong funding score performance contributes directly to university budgets, relaxing
financial constraints at the margin. The GPA score is instead the indicator used to rank a
department’s research quality by the leading providers of REF league tables.27 Success according to
the latter measure of the department’s research quality has thus strong reputational effects, as well as
potentially indirect financial benefits, such as increased awards by competitive funding bodies and
increased Master level student recruitment. This analysis therefore helps us understand the
institutions’ preference between government funding and research reputation.
More formally, using the samples of matched departments we estimate the effects of university
department performance in the REF on the department level wage structure using the following
“difference-in-difference” model:28
∆Yi,t,t−1 − ∆Yj,t,t−1 = α + β1∆RPi,j,t−1 + β2∆Xi,j,t−1 + τp + εi,j (22)
25For example, two departments of the same size in FTE might both achieve a GPA score of 3 but the first department
achieves this through a 100% × 3* profile, and the second department through a 50% × 4*, 50% × 2* profile. While the GPA
scores are identical, the second department would receive £2.50 for each £1 received by the first.
26Editor Andrea Ichino invited us to develop this empirical approach: we wish to thank him for this suggestion.
27See, for example, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/ref-2014-results-table-of-excellence/
2017590.article
28Using a difference-in-difference approach is preferable to using a difference-in-levels one as level differences may reflect
pre-REF heterogeneity across departments.
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In (22) the dependent variable is the difference in the difference at dates t and t− 1 (denoted by t,t− 1)
in outcome Y between department i and department j (which sit under the same main panel), where
i and j form a matched pair by (i) GPA and FTE, or (ii) funding score. The dates we consider are t =
October 2015, and t − 1 = October 2013. The latter is the exact REF census date. The REF results
were published in December 2014, and therefore, given the internal administrative times in funding
a post, the search process, negotiations, and delays prior to an appointee taking up a post, October
2015 is the earliest date where a response to the REF can be detected. As in (21), RP is the measure of
research performance, and ∆RPi,j,t−1 is the difference in research performance between departments i
and j at the time of the REF exercise t− 1. As in the earlier analysis we measure research performance
using (i) funding score and in (ii) GPA. ∆Xi,j,t−1 refers to a set of control variables, defined as the
difference in the variable between departments i and j at the time of the REF exercise t − 1.29 τp is
a set of main panel fixed effects and ε is the error term. Hence the model estimates a difference-in-
difference in an outcome variable within matched pairs. In other words, we exploit differences across
departments in the change in outcome variable (e.g. change in mean salary), estimating whether the
department within a matched pair that received (i) a higher funding score or (ii) a higher GPA did in
fact experience a larger increase in the outcome variable over subsequent years of the data.
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
Practically, our identification strategy rests on the availability of sufficiently close matches
between department-pairs both on GPA and FTE, and on funding score. We limit matched pairs to be
within the same main panel to avoid the risk of mis-matches on important unobservables, such as
wage flexibility or capital requirement. To achieve the closest matches between departments we use a
simple algorithm. In the first matching exercise, we pair departments to minimise the sum of
distances in standardised GPA and FTE. We use an additive quintic loss function, because we want to
avoid being very close on one dimension, say GPA, while being far away on the other, FTE in this
case. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of GPA and FTE across departments in the top two
diagrams and the within-cell differences in GPA and FTE between department pairs in the bottom
two diagrams: within-cell differences are very small for the majority of departments. Hence in many
cases we are able to match pairs of departments with very similar GPA and FTE.30 This gives
variation in the research funding dimension of the assessment, holding research quality constant.
[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
In the second matching exercise, we pair departments by funding score using a
nearest-neighbour match, on the single matching target variable. We do this in order to obtain
plausibly exogenous variation in average quality (GPA) across departments achieving the same
funding score. This gives variation in the research quality dimension of the assessment, holding
research income constant. Analogously to Figure 5, Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of log
funding score across departments in the top figure and the within-cell differences in log funding
29In particular X includes the percent of professors aged under 40, the percent of professors aged between 41-50, the
percent of professors aged between 51-60 and the log of total FTE staff submitted to the REF.
30The closest pair are Geography, Environmental Studies and Archaeology at the University of Hull (GPA 2.96, FTE 34.5)
and Social Work Policy at the University of Birmingham (GPA 2.95, FTE 34.5).
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score between department pairs in the bottom figure. Again, within-cell differences are very small
for most of the distribution. In our main analysis we restrict to the sample of closest matches only
(defined as matches within the interquartile range).31
6 Responses to the REF: Results
We examine four outcomes. First, the natural log of the department mean salary, which answers the
question of the effect on average salaries. Second, the natural log of the total wage bill paid to the top
quartile of professors within the department. This measures the effect of REF performance on
’superstar’ salaries within the department: these individuals could be hired from outside on the
strength of the increased reputation, or be the consequence of counteroffers to professors already in
the department whose visibility has increased because of the REF success. Third, the inequality in
salaries within the department. Fourth, the total number of professors in the department:
departments performing strongly in the exercise may be rewarded with new senior posts and/or
internal promotion of non-professorial staff.
[Insert Table 10 about here.]
The funding score determines the direct monetary research funding allocation given by the
government to universities as a result of the REF performance of its academic departments. Table 10
shows results for the sample of departments that are closely matched by GPA and FTE.32 Results
reveal no statistically significant coefficients on the funding score variable in any of the estimated
models. These results indicate that, for a given research quality, the receipt of higher funding by the
university in which the department sits appears not to cause any changes in the wage structure of the
department. In other words, the financial benefits of REF performance appear not to influence the
wage outcomes of the professors within the department.
[Insert Table 11 about here.]
This picture however changes when we estimate the effect of GPA score on department wage
structure. GPA is a measure of the average research quality of a department, commonly employed as
the headline measure of research quality by the media and the public. Table 11 reports results for the
sample of departments that are closely matched by Funding Score.33 While there is no statistically
significant effect from higher GPA on mean salaries, the estimates reveal a positive effect on the top
quartile wage bill which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient value of 0.072
implies that a department achieving a one standard deviation higher GPA score, one for example that
31Results for the full sample of matches, which are qualitatively unchanged from this in the sample of closest matches),
are shown in A5 and A6).
32Specifically, we restrict the sample to the interquartile range of the difference in the error term from the additive quintic
loss function employed to match departments. We show results for the full sample in Table A5. Results in the full sample
are very similar to those in the restricted sample.
33Specifically, we restrict the sample to the interquartile range of the difference in the error term from the additive quintic
loss function employed to match departments. We show results for the full sample in Table A6. Results in the full sample
are very similar to those in the restricted sample. Tables A9 and A10 in the Appendix explore the possible presence of
spillovers between departments within the same faculty. It does so by replacing the difference in performance variable at
the departmental level with the same variable at main panel level. This evidence is suggestive that spillovers might be
present.
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passes from the sample mean to 87-th percentile, would see growth in the wage bill of top paid staff
which is 2% higher than that in a matched department with the same funding score, but achieved
with a lower GPA. In the sample the mean growth in salaries (in real terms) over the period is 4.2%.
Hence departments achieving a one standard deviation higher GPA score experience a 50% higher
pay growth. It should be noted that there is no contradiction in principle between an increase in
top-level wages and lack of change of the mean salary.34
In the final model shown in Column 4 for the change in total FTE of professors within the
department, we see a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient value of
approximately 6 implies that a department with one standard deviation higher GPA score sees
approximately an additional two staff added to the unit. In the sample the change in professorial FTE
over the period at the 75th percentile is 1.12 (hence on average departments grow by approximately
one person in the two-year period after the REF). Hence higher GPA performance by one unit causes
departments to grow approximately twice as fast than this rate of growth in the sample. Summing
up, the response to REF success seems to be in the guise of more senior posts and increases in the
wage at the top of the distribution.
In additional analysis, shown in Table A11, we show results from models estimated on main
panel sub-samples, using the same empirical specification. The effect of GPA on the top quartile
wage bill arises only in the science and engineering and social sciences panels. This is perhaps
unsurprising: in the UK, academic salary grades for clinical academics are more regulated, as they
are set in co-ordination with the Department for Health. Conversely, top salaries in the arts and
humanities are lower than in other fields. Similarly, our findings indicate that GPA impacts
professorial FTE in medicine, science and engineering, and social sciences, but not in the arts and
humanities. The coefficient is particularly large in medicine, suggesting that universities respond to
strong GPA performance by expanding the size of the professoriate, rewarding departments on the
margin of headcount which is unregulated, unlike clinical academic salaries. One tentative
conclusion is thus the absence of any benefits to arts and humanities departments from stronger REF
performance.
From a policy perspective, a general conclusion from the exercise carried out in this section is
that the research evaluation creates a measure of research quality, the GPA, and that departments
which perform strongly in terms of this indicator are rewarded by higher wages and expansion in the
size of their professorial body. Even when the increase in GPA does not result in a higher
contribution to the university coffer, universities internal funding allocation processes undo the
desire of the government to reward disproportionately “world leading” research, with the intuitive
GPA formula driving instead the rewards to centres of excellence within institutions. In other words,
prestige appears to offer departments a stronger claim to internal funds to be devoted to salaries than
the direct financial contribution arising from the REF. This result could well arise because GPA
delivers, in addition to the reputation benefit, substantial indirect financial benefits to the university,
34If new hires or promotions are made in the middle of the wage distribution as well as the very top, then the overall
effect on inequality may be small. For example, consider a department with 12 professors, four of them paid 60, four paid
70 and four paid 100. Suppose that, as a consequence of the REF results, this department ends up with four extra professors,
for a total of 16, three paid 60, two paid 65, seven paid 70, 3 paid 100, and a superstar paid 130. Easy calculations show that
the Gini and the average pay are roughly unchanged, but the average pay of the top quartile increases from 100 to 107.5.
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via a “multiplier” effect on grant funding and post-graduate student recruitment on top of the direct
effect of the funding formula.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between pay and research performance in UK universities. The
UK setting is especially interesting because universities research quality is periodically assessed in a
national exercise, now labelled REF, and because they can freely compete on the salaries they offer to
senior academics.
Our empirical analysis, guided by a simple theoretical model where academics differ in ability and
are inputs into the production of research, and universities seek to maximise the weighted average
research quality, shows a positive pay-performance relationship in all disciplines. This is true both
in subjects areas which anecdotal evidence suggests to be more competitive, such as business and
management, economics, engineering, but also in subjects where there appears to be far less cross-
institution movement of staff and possibly less competition, such as disciplines within the arts and
humanities. Inequality of pay is also associated with higher research performance, especially in the
more research intensive institutions.
That universities respond to REF rules by pursuing academics who will contribute to the
measured research performance is suggested also by our analysis of the three components that make
up the aggregate research score. The positive salary-performance gradient is due mainly to the
relationship between salary and scholarly publications: when an academic moves, this is the
component of her recent record that can be transferred from one institution to another, whereas any
“impact” that her research may have had contributes to the score of her previous institution.
Those whose task is to design the details of the evaluation process should also consider our
consistent finding that, after controlling for other potential covariates, panel membership is
associated with stronger performance, and this result in turn is driven by the effect of panel
membership on the arguably more subjective “environment” and “impact” components of the
evaluation, which, incidentally, will see their weight increased in the next assessment exercise, the
REF2021.
The salary structure snapshot taken in October 2013, can of course only highlight the presence of
correlations, which, while interesting on their own, lack a casual interpretation. To delve more deeply
in the relationship between REF performance and subsequent changes in department wage structure,
we have employed a difference-in-differences estimator combined with a matching strategy. Our
results in Section 6 suggest that while bringing additional funding to the institution does not affect the
professorial pay structure in a department, additional prestige does, in the form of increases in the top
pay, and in the number of professors. One realistic explanation is that the extra cash simply ends up
in the university budget, whereas “prestige” gives departments additional power in the negotiations
for the allocation of the budget, or easier access to senior potential appointees, or, finally, increase the
pressure on senior staff retention budgets by making current professor more visible externally.
While individual UK academics and administrators will no doubt find these results of much
interest, they warrant wider attention, as they contain important lessons on the effects of liberalising
pay and introducing competition for resources in a largely publicly funded system. These lessons
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may be useful for other European countries, which are in the process of developing and
strengthening quasi-market systems in the university sector.
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Table 1: Department-Level Pay Summary Statistics, 2013-14
Mean Min Median SD Max
Professorial FTE (N) 13.98 3.00 9.00 19.48 311.00
Average Salary (£000s) 73.67 50.87 72.89 9.85 128.46
Gini Coefficient Salary (x100) 8.22 0.25 7.81 4.06 35.62
% Age under 40 5.26 0.00 0.00 9.11 66.67
% Age 41-50 31.08 0.00 30.77 18.47 100.00
% Age 51-60 38.27 0.00 36.36 19.54 100.00
% Age over 60 25.39 0.00 23.08 18.50 100.00
Vice Chancellor Pay (£000s) 300.73 143.00 284.00 63.48 623.00
Department has a REF Panel Member 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.49 1.00
Academic FTE Submitted to REF (N) 34.01 2.00 24.72 32.83 449.74
Note: Sample size = 1093 academic departments submitted to REF 2014 which remain in existence in 2015/16 academic
year. Professorial FTE is the total FTE of full professors in the department. Academic FTE submitted to REF 2014 measures
the total number of FTE (including non-professorial researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Vice Chancellor pay
is total remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments). Department has a REF Panel Member is a dummy
variable indicating whether the REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department.
Table 2: Department-Level Pay Summary Statistics, 2015-16
Mean Min Median SD Max
Professorial FTE (N) 14.14 1.02 8.67 20.10 315.50
Average Salary (£000s) 76.62 54.79 75.47 10.41 173.78
Gini Coefficient Salary (x100) 8.15 0.00 7.80 4.14 29.81
% Age under 40 4.07 0.00 0.00 7.51 50.00
% Age 41-50 30.16 0.00 30.00 18.55 100.00
% Age 51-60 40.92 0.00 40.00 19.67 100.00
% Age over 60 24.85 0.00 23.58 18.20 100.00
Note: Sample size = 1093 academic departments submitted to REF 2014 which remain in existence in 2015/16 academic
year. Professorial FTE is the total FTE of full professors in the department. Vice Chancellor pay is total remuneration
(including salary and discretionary payments).
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Table 3: Changes in Department-Level Pay Summary Statistics, 2013-2016
Mean Median SD Min 25th 75th Max
Change in Professorial FTE (N) 0.16 0.00 3.09 -24.50 -1.00 1.12 19.99
Change in Average Salary (£000s) 2.94 2.84 4.77 -21.79 0.72 4.99 46.72
Change in Gini Coefficient Salary (x100) -0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.20 -0.01 0.01 0.13
Change in Top Quartile Wage Bill (£000s) 22.63 2.60 186.40 -1469.35 -46.40 72.73 2620.19
Change in Professorial FTE (%) 1.26 0.00 28.03 -80.71 -14.62 15.15 175.00
Change in Average Salary (%) 4.20 3.94 6.41 -20.61 0.98 6.79 45.22
Change in Top Quartile Wage Bill (%) 12.25 3.02 49.48 -70.85 -14.20 24.29 215.94
Note: Sample size = 1093 academic departments submitted to REF 2014 which remain in existence in 2015/16 academic
year. Change in Professorial FTE is the change in the total FTE of full professors in the department. Change in Average
Salary is the change in the average salary of full professors in the department. Change in Top Quartile Wage Bill is the
change in the sum of the salaries paid to the top-25% of full professors by salary. Change in Gini Coefficient Salary is the
change in the department’s Gini Coefficient on salary.
Table 4: Department-Level REF Outcome Summary Statistics
Mean Min Median SD Max
Funding Score 59.48 0.36 38.63 74.90 939.96
Overall Grade Point Average 2.97 1.51 3.02 0.33 3.78
Outputs Grade Point Average 2.87 1.39 2.91 0.29 3.68
Environment Grade Point Average 3.14 0.75 3.20 0.58 4.00
Impact Grade Point Average 3.16 0.70 3.27 0.53 4.00
Note: Sample size = 1093 academic departments submitted to REF 2014 which remain in existence in 2015/16 academic
year. Definitions of Funding Score and other REF Grade Point Average variables are provided in the main text.
Table 5: Correlation Between REF Performance Measures
Funding GPA GPA GPA GPA
Score Score Outputs Environment Impact
Funding Score 1
GPA Score 0.473*** 1
GPA Outputs 0.369*** 0.901*** 1
GPA Environment 0.506*** 0.845*** 0.635*** 1
GPA Impact 0.379*** 0.777*** 0.477*** 0.644*** 1
Note: Sample size = 1093 departments submitted to REF 2014. For explanation of REF performance measures see main
text. Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table 6: OLS Regression Estimates: Department Pay Characteristics and REF 2014
Performance. Dependent Variable: Log REF Funding Score
(1) (2) (3)
Log Average Salary 0.493*** 0.842*** 0.510***
(0.096) (0.092) (0.091)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.914*** 1.030*** 0.568*
(0.317) (0.290) (0.271)
Log Professorial FTE 0.037* 0.149*** 0.110***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Log REF FTE 1.118*** 1.092*** 1.050***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Panel Member = 1 0.142*** 0.090*** 0.060***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.280*** 0.179*** 0.117**
(0.055) (0.050) (0.047)
% Age under 40 -0.015 0.318*** 0.222*
(0.118) (0.111) (0.104)
% Age 41-50 -0.120* 0.096 0.059
(0.067) (0.063) (0.059)
% Age 51-60 -0.082 0.024 -0.052
(0.064) (0.060) (0.056)
1994 Group Uni. = 1 -0.024
(0.024)
Other Type Uni. = 1 -0.205***
(0.028)
New Uni = 1 -0.414***
(0.034)
Specialist Uni = 1 -0.072
(0.112)
University Type FE NO YES YES
Institution Type FE NO YES YES
R-squared 0.866 0.898 0.913
Observations 1093 1093 1093
Note: Sample size = 1093 academic departments submitted to REF 2014. The dependent variable in the OLS regression is
the natural log of research funding score. Regressors are shown in table rows. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of
the total FTE of full professors in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including
non-professorial researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether
the REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log
of the total remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. Standard
errors in parenthesis. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table 7: OLS Regression Estimates By REF Main Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
Medicine Science & Social Arts &
Engineering Sciences Humanities
Log Average Salary 1.082*** 0.611*** 0.401** 0.809***
(0.257) (0.206) (0.163) (0.149)
Gini Coefficient Salary 1.465* 1.566*** 0.544 0.794
(0.722) (0.578) (0.571) (0.540)
Log Professorial FTE -0.042 0.200*** 0.027 0.130***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.041) (0.038)
Log REF FTE 1.141*** 1.030*** 1.226*** 1.000***
(0.048) (0.051) (0.043) (0.037)
Panel Member = 1 0.092* 0.095* 0.165*** 0.129***
(0.053) (0.044) (0.040) (0.035)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.237* 0.235* 0.281*** 0.134*
(0.135) (0.109) (0.098) (0.081)
% Age under 40 0.053 0.438 0.144 0.098
(0.327) (0.284) (0.183) (0.188)
% Age 41-50 0.018 0.011 0.041 -0.030
(0.182) (0.145) (0.119) (0.093)
% Age 51-60 0.053 -0.133 0.046 -0.059
(0.164) (0.151) (0.115) (0.087)
University Type FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.921 0.894 0.849 0.876
Observations 183 263 369 278
Note: Dependent variable is natural log of research funding score. OLS regression estimated on four mutually exclusive
samples of academic departments categorised by REF Main Panel. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of the total
FTE of full professors in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including non-
professorial researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the
REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of
the total remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. * Denotes
significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
31
Table 8: OLS Regression Estimates By University Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Russell 1994 Others New
Log Average Salary 0.170* 0.322* 1.125*** 1.800***
(0.102) (0.171) (0.264) (0.400)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.763** 1.056* -0.909 -0.665
(0.298) (0.498) (0.768) (1.098)
Log Professorial FTE 0.092*** 0.138*** 0.297*** 0.078
(0.025) (0.040) (0.057) (0.073)
Log REF FTE 1.077*** 0.969*** 0.986*** 1.062***
(0.026) (0.044) (0.055) (0.062)
Panel Member = 1 0.043* 0.077* 0.051 0.152*
(0.023) (0.034) (0.053) (0.086)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.153*** 0.023 -0.064 0.007
(0.056) (0.092) (0.139) (0.144)
% Age under 40 -0.124 0.571*** 0.145 0.136
(0.144) (0.198) (0.315) (0.263)
% Age 41-50 0.003 0.304** 0.074 0.036
(0.086) (0.122) (0.145) (0.156)
% Age 51-60 -0.039 0.195* -0.006 -0.109
(0.083) (0.117) (0.131) (0.144)
Unit of Assessment FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.939 0.882 0.882 0.820
Observations 421 256 211 198
Note: Dependent variable is natural log of research funding score. OLS regression estimated on four mutually exclusive
samples of academic departments categorised by University Type. Sample of ’specialist’ universities not included as it
contains only 8 observations. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of the total FTE of full professors in the department.
Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including non-professorial researchers) submitted to the REF
evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included
a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of the total remuneration (including salary
and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. See Appendix A for details of classifications of
universities. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table 9: OLS Regression Estimates: Department Pay Characteristics and REF Component
Funding Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Funding Outputs Environment Impact
Log Average Salary 0.510*** 0.547*** 0.540*** 0.416*
(0.091) (0.092) (0.183) (0.191)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.568* 0.398 1.923*** 0.100
(0.271) (0.276) (0.547) (0.572)
Log Professorial FTE 0.110*** 0.082*** 0.166*** 0.161***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.041) (0.043)
Log REF FTE 1.050*** -0.000 0.359*** 0.145***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.044)
Panel Member = 1 0.060*** 0.024 0.148*** 0.124***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.039) (0.041)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.117** 0.203*** 0.107 -0.024
(0.047) (0.048) (0.096) (0.100)
% Age under 40 0.222* 0.203* 0.473* 0.210
(0.104) (0.106) (0.209) (0.219)
% Age 41-50 0.059 0.093 0.063 -0.058
(0.059) (0.060) (0.119) (0.125)
% Age 51-60 -0.052 -0.053 0.032 -0.121
(0.056) (0.057) (0.113) (0.118)
1994 Group Uni. = 1 -0.024 -0.017 -0.007 -0.028
(0.024) (0.024) (0.048) (0.050)
Other Type Uni. = 1 -0.205*** -0.233*** -0.316*** -0.182***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.056) (0.059)
New Uni = 1 -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.572*** -0.386***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.069) (0.072)
Specialist Uni = 1 -0.072 -0.044 -0.507* 0.089
(0.112) (0.114) (0.225) (0.236)
Unit of Assessment FE YES YES YES YES
University Type FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.913 0.492 0.526 0.294
Observations 1093 1093 1093 1093
Note: Sample size = 1093 departments submitted to REF 2014. The dependent variable is obtained from formula (20).
Column (1) is the same as Column (3) in Table 6. Column (2) the funding score for the department output component,
Column (3) environment component and Column (4) impact component. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of the
total FTE of full professors in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including non-
professorial researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the
REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of the
total remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. See Appendix
A for details of classifications of universities. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table 10: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 Funding Score on Changes
in Departmental Wage Structure, 2013 - 2016 (Sample of Closest Matches Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
Funding Score -0.012 0.025 0.005 1.127
(0.020) (0.446) (0.008) (0.934)
% Age under 40 -0.017 1.832 0.017 7.285***
(0.056) (1.282) (0.023) (2.684)
% Age 41-50 -0.048* 0.692 -0.007 0.448
(0.027) (0.616) (0.011) (1.289)
% Age 51-60 0.002 0.403 -0.002 -0.530
(0.024) (0.546) (0.010) (1.142)
Log REF FTE 0.005 0.237 -0.001 -0.878*
(0.011) (0.241) (0.004) (0.503)
Main Panel FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.020 0.013 0.005 0.051
Observations 280 280 280 280
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable
and funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by GPA
and FTE) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. Other control variables are differences between
the matched departments in levels measured in the 2013 data. Sample restricts to the closest matched departments (within
the interquartile range of matches). * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table 11: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 GPA on Changes in
Departmental Wage Structure, 2013 - 2016 (Sample of Closest Matches Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
GPA Score -1.502 0.072*** -0.021 5.988***
(2.528) (0.019) (0.044) (1.228)
% Age under 40 -0.270 -0.074 0.025 2.002
(1.309) (0.051) (0.023) (2.707)
% Age 41-50 -0.598 -0.012 -0.004 0.088
(0.644) (0.025) (0.011) (1.332)
% Age 51-60 0.854 0.002 -0.002 -0.975
(0.634) (0.025) (0.011) (1.312)
Log REF FTE -0.128 0.012 -0.002 0.193
(0.216) (0.008) (0.004) (0.446)
Main Panel FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.029 0.017 0.007 0.010
Observations 272 272 272 272
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable and
funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by Funding
Score) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. Other control variables are differences between the
matched departments in levels measured in the 2013 data. Sample restricts to the closest matched departments (within
the interquartile range of matches). * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Average Salary and REF Performance (Funding Score) Among
Academic Departments by REF Main Panel and University Type, 2013
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Note: The upper part of the Figure illustrates distribution of average departmental salary among academic departments
classified by REF Main Panel and university type. The lower part shows the distribution of REF Funding Score in
academic departments, again classified by REF Main Panel and university type. Kernel density functions, epanechnikov
kernel.
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Figure 2: Correlation Between Mean Pay and REF Funding Score
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Note: Each observation is an individual academic department. Figure show scatter plots and fitted regression lines.
Observations grouped by REF Main Panel (Plot group A) and University Type (Plot group B)
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Figure 3: Plot of Estimated Unit of Assessment Fixed Effects from Regression Model (Omitted
































































































































































































































Note: Figure shows a plot of the estimated unit of assessment fixed effects from Table 6, Column 3. Omitted group is Unit
of Assessment 18, Economics and Econometrics. 95% confidence intervals shown in whiskers.
38














































































































































































































































Note: Figure shows regression coefficient values and 95% confidence intervals (shown by vertical whisker bars) for
coefficient estimates on average pay variable in OLS regression of funding score against average pay and controls (control
variables as in Table 6, Column 1). Separate regressions estimated for each unit of assessment sample.
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Figure 5: Distributions of Grade Point Average and Research Power Across Units and Within
Matched Pairs
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Figure 6: Distributions of Log Funding Score Across Units and Within Matched Pairs
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Appendix
A Classification of UK Universities by Types
This appendix lists the members of the University ’Type’ Groups used in the analysis (excluding
therefore institutions with fewer than three professors, or which did not make a submission to the
REF, and the London Business School). These groupings are based on the membership of University
associations during the relevant period. For each institution, we give in brackets the number of
panels to which a submission was made, the fulltime equivalent number of staff submitted, and the
fulltime equivalent number of full professors in post in October 2013.
Russell Group: In 1994 a group of 17 ’research intensive’ UK universities formed an association
known as the ’Russell Group’, which grew to 20 Universities by 2006. In 2012 four additional
universities joined from the newly-defunct ’1994’ group. Our classification of ’Russell Group’ uses
the 20 members from 2006 onwards on the basis that this group represents long-running core
members.
University of Birmingham (29, 990, 411)
University of Bristol (26, 981, 487)
University of Cambridge (28, 1874, 711)
University of Leeds (26, 1015, 428)
University of Liverpool (16, 584, 253)
Imperial College, London (10, 1071, 612)
King’s College London (19, 861, 496)
London School of Economics (12, 490, 249)
University College London (29, 2059, 902)
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (24, 809, 374)
University of Nottingham (23, 1053, 430)
University of Oxford (28, 2264, 905)
University of Sheffield (24, 770, 394)
University of Southampton (23, 878, 392)
University of Warwick (21, 907, 474)
University of Edinburgh (28, 1603, 558)
University of Glasgow (25, 887, 400)
Cardiff University (24, 679, 590)
The Queen’s University of Belfast (21, 729, 193)
University of Manchester (30, 1426, 780)
The 1994 Group: The ’1994’ Group was also formed in 1994, its membership comprising smaller
research-intensive universities that had not been invited to join the Russell Group. This group
disbanded in 2012.
University of Bath (11, 414, 137)
University of Durham (20, 629, 250)
University of East Anglia (16, 353, 150)
University of Essex (10, 304, 131)
University of Exeter (19, 621, 230)
University of Lancaster (14, 503, 173)
University of Leicester (19, 576, 237)
Birkbeck College (11, 254, 92)
Queen Mary University of London (16, 556, 326)
Royal Holloway and Bedford (16, 360, 182)
School of Oriental and African Studies (8, 134, 78)
Loughborough University (13, 544, 154)
University of Reading (20, 537, 223)
University of Surrey (11, 362, 103)
University of Sussex (18, 443, 175)
University of York (23, 628, 264)
University of St Andrews (18, 498, 205)
“New” Universities: This group comprises institutions which were given status as universities
from 1992 onwards. Prior to that time most of the members of this group were known as ‘polytechnics’
and delivered mainly post-high school technical education.
A1
Buckinghamshire New University (1, 7, 6)
University of Chester (4, 45, 19)
Canterbury Christ Church University (2, 36, 8)
Edge Hill University (4, 55, 13)
Falmouth University (2, 50, 7)
Harper Adams University (1, 17, 3)
University of Winchester (1, 12, 4)
Liverpool Hope University (3, 38, 18)
University of Bedfordshire (7, 111, 47)
University of Northampton (1, 13, 3)
Roehampton University (6, 74, 34)
University of Worcester (1, 10, 3)
Anglia Ruskin University (5, 55, 35)
Bath Spa University (2, 26, 19)
Bournemouth University (4, 80, 35)
University of Brighton (6, 145, 29)
Birmingham City University (8, 98, 42)
University of Gloucestershire (4, 37, 15)
Coventry University (3, 44, 16)
University of East London (6, 78, 27)
University of Greenwich (3, 41, 12)
University of Hertfordshire (8, 138, 39)
University of Lincoln (9, 92, 34)
Kingston University (7, 115, 46)
Leeds Beckett University (5, 116, 31)
Liverpool John Moores University (9, 138, 47)
Manchester Metropolitan University (7, 220, 35)
Middlesex University (9, 257, 80)
De Montfort University (7, 136, 49)
Nottingham Trent University (7, 118, 58)
Oxford Brookes University (12, 204, 66)
University of Plymouth (13, 295, 101)
University of Portsmouth (5, 109, 25)
Sheffield Hallam University (7, 139, 37)
London South Bank University (1, 34, 4)
Teesside University (1, 16, 6)
University of West London (3, 29, 13)
University of the West of England (8, 192, 72)
University of Chichester (1, 8, 3)
University of Wolverhampton (7, 119, 37)
Cardiff Metropolitan University (2, 23, 9)
University of South Wales (4, 37, 16)
University of Abertay Dundee (1, 14, 3)
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh (1, 8, 5)
Robert Gordon University (2, 20, 10)
Glasgow Caledonian University (5, 108, 41)
Edinburgh Napier University (5, 65, 28)
University of Ulster (14, 311, 123)
London Metropolitan University (2, 17, 9)
Specialists: This group comprises a set of high specialised universities offering a limited range of
subjects including, in some cases, universities offering only a single subject.
Royal College of Art (1, 60, 7)
University of the Arts, London (1, 110, 27)
Royal Academy of Music (1, 14, 4)
Royal Northern College of Music (1, 11, 5)
Royal Veterinary College (1, 103, 33)
St George’s Hospital Medical School (1, 44, 41)
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (1,
57, 66)
University for the Creative Arts (1, 21, 7)
Guildhall School of Music and Drama (1, 16, 105)
Others: Universities not included in any of the above groups are assigned to this ’other’ group.
The Open University (12, 325, 96)
Cranfield University (3, 224, 50)
University of Central Lancashire (11, 201, 52)
University of Huddersfield (10, 144, 61)
University of Westminster (8, 138, 53)
Aston University (5, 164, 45)
University of Bradford (4, 93, 44)
Brunel University London (15, 452, 97)
City University (10, 316, 141)
University of Hull (10, 244, 54)
University of Keele (13, 239, 71)
University of Kent (18, 500, 135)
Goldsmiths College (10, 210, 82)
University of Salford (8, 185, 71)
University of Strathclyde (14, 508, 174)
University of Aberdeen (19, 475, 236)
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Heriot-Watt University (8, 212, 75)
University of Dundee (11, 287, 110)
University of Stirling (12, 239, 83)
Aberystwyth University (11, 202, 71)
Bangor University (2, 70, 17)
Swansea University (14, 330, 149)
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The problem of department i is:
max
L1,L2
ln θk + α1 ln L1 + α2 ln L2 + βi ln K,
s.t.: rK = Bi − w1L1 − w2L2,
L` = µ`w`, ` = 1, 2.














− βi ln r
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Bi, ` = 1, 2. (A1)
It is easily checked that the second order conditions are satisfied. Substitute (A1) into (3) and using







the expression for the level of capital. The total research output is also obtained by direct substitution
as







Proof of Lemma 2. We need to substitute (A1) into (1), and carry out simple calculations to find that
salaries for the two types of academics in department i in institution k are given by (10), and the Gini
coefficent by (11).



















= 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Rearranging, we derive (16). For this condition to identify a maximum, 14 B
1
2 ci−2
i (ci − 2) c
1− 12 ci
i must be
negative, which is the case if ci < 2, that is if βi < 1− α1+α22 , as assumed.
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C Additional tables and figures
Table A1: Summary Statistics Departmental Level REF Performance by Component
mean sd min max
Overall % 4* 26.88 14.66 0.00 79.00
Overall % 3* 47.46 11.89 3.00 83.00
Overall % 2* 21.95 12.08 0.00 75.00
Overall % 1* 3.23 5.23 0.00 55.00
Overall % 0* 0.48 1.29 0.00 10.00
Outputs % 4* 21.79 11.24 0.00 69.70
Outputs % 3* 48.44 12.23 0.00 100.00
Outputs % 2* 25.44 12.05 0.00 72.90
Outputs % 1* 3.82 5.68 0.00 60.60
Outputs % 0* 0.50 1.15 0.00 10.30
Environment % 4* 34.03 33.46 0.00 100.00
Environment % 3* 47.83 27.50 0.00 100.00
Environment % 2* 16.39 23.39 0.00 100.00
Environment % 1* 1.73 8.32 0.00 90.00
Environment % 0* 0.03 0.81 0.00 25.00
Impact % 4* 38.00 28.04 0.00 100.00
Impact % 3* 43.98 22.94 0.00 100.00
Impact % 2* 14.93 19.48 0.00 100.00
Impact % 1* 2.32 8.26 0.00 90.00
Impact % 0* 0.77 4.82 0.00 40.00
Note: Sample size = 1093 departments submitted to REF 2014. For explanation of REF performance measures see main
text.
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Table A2: OLS Regression Estimates: Department Pay Characteristics and REF 2014
Performance. Dependent Variable: Grade Point Average Score
(1) (2) (3)
Log Average Salary 0.430*** 0.715*** 0.433***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.071)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.698*** 0.581** 0.194
(0.246) (0.231) (0.214)
Log Professorial FTE 0.032* 0.112*** 0.080***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Log REF FTE 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.059***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Panel Member = 1 0.109*** 0.072*** 0.047***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.222*** 0.147*** 0.096**
(0.043) (0.040) (0.037)
% Age under 40 0.040 0.245*** 0.163*
(0.092) (0.089) (0.082)
% Age 41-50 -0.032 0.071 0.037
(0.052) (0.050) (0.047)
% Age 51-60 -0.041 0.009 -0.056
(0.050) (0.048) (0.044)
1994 Group Uni. = 1 -0.013
(0.019)
Other Type Uni. = 1 -0.171***
(0.022)
New Uni = 1 -0.347***
(0.027)
Specialist Uni = 1 -0.083
(0.088)
University Type FE NO YES YES
Institution Type FE NO YES YES
R-squared 0.343 0.477 0.563
Observations 1093 1093 1093
Notes: Dependent variable is GPA score. Column 1 includes log average salary and log sd salary only. Additional
columns add control variables as described in table header. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of the total FTE of
full professors in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including non-professorial
researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the REF 2014
main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of the total
remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. Standard errors in
parenthesis. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A3: OLS Regression Estimates by Main Panel (Grade Point Average Score)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
Medicine Science & Social Arts &
Engineering Sciences Humanities
Log Average Salary 0.753*** 0.482*** 0.422*** 0.756***
(0.201) (0.154) (0.126) (0.134)
Gini Coefficient Salary 1.204* 1.066** 0.090 0.451
(0.566) (0.432) (0.440) (0.483)
Log Professorial FTE -0.038 0.163*** 0.019 0.115***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034)
Log REF FTE 0.122*** 0.032 0.208*** 0.015
(0.037) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033)
Panel Member = 1 0.080* 0.080** 0.124*** 0.106***
(0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.219* 0.177* 0.237*** 0.115
(0.106) (0.082) (0.076) (0.072)
% Age under 40 -0.074 0.417* 0.167 0.068
(0.256) (0.212) (0.141) (0.168)
% Age 41-50 0.056 -0.006 0.098 -0.052
(0.143) (0.109) (0.091) (0.083)
% Age 51-60 0.046 -0.121 0.074 -0.073
(0.128) (0.113) (0.089) (0.078)
University Type FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.418 0.497 0.398 0.320
Observations 183 263 369 278
Note: Dependent variable is GPA score. OLS regression estimated on four mutually exclusive samples of academic
departments categorised by REF Main Panel. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of the total FTE of full professors
in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including non-professorial researchers)
submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the REF 2014 main panel
or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of the total remuneration
(including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. Standard errors in parenthesis. *
Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A4: OLS Regression Estimates Omitting Medicine UOA
(1) (2)
Funding Score GPA Score
Log Average Salary 0.497*** 0.426***
(0.092) (0.072)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.530* 0.155
(0.276) (0.217)
Log Professorial FTE 0.111*** 0.080***
(0.021) (0.016)
Log REF FTE 1.058*** 0.064***
(0.021) (0.017)
Panel Member = 1 0.061*** 0.049***
(0.020) (0.016)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.109* 0.090**
(0.048) (0.038)
% Age under 40 0.222* 0.163*
(0.104) (0.082)
% Age 41-50 0.050 0.032
(0.060) (0.047)
% Age 51-60 -0.059 -0.061
(0.056) (0.044)
1994 Group Uni. = 1 -0.027 -0.015
(0.024) (0.019)
Other Type Uni. = 1 -0.207*** -0.172***
(0.028) (0.022)
New Uni = 1 -0.420*** -0.351***
(0.034) (0.027)
Specialist Uni = 1 -0.118 -0.108
(0.133) (0.104)
Unit of Assessment FE YES YES
University Type FE YES YES
R-squared 0.906 0.565
Observations 1067 1067
Note: Dependent variable is the natural log of the Funding Score in Column 1 and the natural log of the GPA score in
Column 2. OLS regressions estimated on the main sample minus departments in the Medicine Unit of Assessment. Log
Professorial FTE is the natural log of the total FTE of full professors in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of
the total number of FTE (including non-professorial researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is
a dummy variable indicating whether the REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log
Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of the total remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the
University Vice Chancellor. Standard errors in parenthesis. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 Funding Score on
Changes in Departmental Wage Structure, 2013 - 2016 (Full Samples of Matches)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
Funding Score 0.002 -0.028 0.005 1.001
(0.005) (0.119) (0.004) (0.758)
% Age under 40 -0.053 2.642*** 0.021 6.970***
(0.037) (0.895) (0.017) (1.950)
% Age 41-50 -0.032* 0.245 -0.011 1.144
(0.017) (0.423) (0.008) (0.921)
% Age 51-60 -0.001 0.403 -0.007 -0.087
(0.016) (0.393) (0.007) (0.855)
Log REF FTE -0.002 0.050 -0.003 -0.525
(0.007) (0.169) (0.003) (0.368)
Main Panel FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.013 0.016 0.019 0.068
Observations 562 562 562 562
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable
and funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by GPA
and FTE) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. Other control variables are differences between
the matched departments in levels measured in the 2013 data. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1%
level.
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Table A6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 GPA on Changes in
Departmental Wage Structure, 2013 - 2016 (Full Samples of Matches)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
GPA Score -0.073 0.067*** 0.011 6.226***
(0.098) (0.023) (0.011) (1.173)
% Age under 40 0.859 -0.091*** 0.012 4.540***
(0.895) (0.034) (0.016) (1.756)
% Age 41-50 0.294 -0.007 0.002 1.656*
(0.437) (0.017) (0.008) (0.857)
% Age 51-60 0.647 0.005 0.002 -0.614
(0.431) (0.016) (0.008) (0.845)
Log REF FTE 0.073 0.012* 0.002 -0.604*
(0.140) (0.005) (0.002) (0.276)
Main Panel FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.008 0.031 0.004 0.039
Observations 571 571 571 571
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable and
funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by Funding
Score) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. Other control variables are differences between the
matched departments in levels measured in the 2013 data. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A7: OLS Regression Estimates: Department Pay Characteristics and REF 2014
Performance. Dependent Variable: Grade Point Average Score
(1) (2) (3)
Log Average Salary 0.435*** 0.728*** 0.444***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.071)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.678*** 0.552** 0.176
(0.246) (0.230) (0.213)
Log Professorial FTE 0.034* 0.116*** 0.083***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Log REF FTE 0.116*** 0.091*** 0.057***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Panel Member = 1 0.107*** 0.068*** 0.044***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.226*** 0.155*** 0.099***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.037)
% Age under 40 0.042 0.251*** 0.168*
(0.092) (0.088) (0.081)
% Age 41-50 -0.028 0.078 0.043
(0.052) (0.050) (0.046)
% Age 51-60 -0.044 0.007 -0.057
(0.050) (0.047) (0.044)
Proportion PT Staff 0.100* 0.174*** 0.122**
(0.055) (0.051) (0.048)
1994 Group Uni. = 1 -0.020
(0.019)
Other Type Uni. = 1 -0.169***
(0.022)
New Uni = 1 -0.346***
(0.027)
Specialist Uni = 1 -0.097
(0.088)
R-squared 0.345 0.482 0.565
Observations 1093 1093 1093
Notes: Dependent variable is GPA score. Column 1 includes log average salary and log sd salary only. Additional
columns add control variables as described in table header. Standard errors in parenthesis. Log Professorial FTE is the
natural log of the total FTE of full professors in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of
FTE (including non-professorial researchers) submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable
indicating whether the REF 2014 main panel or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor
pay is the natural log of the total remuneration (including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice
Chancellor. Standard errors in parenthesis. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A8: OLS Regression Estimates: Department Pay Characteristics and REF 2014
Performance. Dependent Variable: Log REF Funding Score
(1) (2) (3)
Log Average Salary 0.500*** 0.858*** 0.524***
(0.096) (0.092) (0.091)
Gini Coefficient Salary 0.891*** 0.996*** 0.546*
(0.317) (0.289) (0.271)
Log Professorial FTE 0.039* 0.154*** 0.114***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Log REF FTE 1.115*** 1.089*** 1.048***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Panel Member = 1 0.140*** 0.085*** 0.056***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
Log Vice Chancellor Pay 0.285*** 0.188*** 0.121**
(0.055) (0.050) (0.047)
% Age under 40 -0.012 0.326*** 0.229*
(0.118) (0.111) (0.104)
% Age 41-50 -0.115* 0.105* 0.065
(0.067) (0.063) (0.059)
% Age 51-60 -0.085 0.021 -0.054
(0.064) (0.060) (0.056)
Proportion PT Staff 0.114 0.209*** 0.150**
(0.071) (0.064) (0.061)
1994 Group Uni. = 1 -0.032
(0.024)
Other Type Uni. = 1 -0.203***
(0.028)
New Uni = 1 -0.414***
(0.034)
Specialist Uni = 1 -0.089
(0.112)
Unit of Assessment FE NO YES YES
University Type FE NO NO YES
R-squared 0.867 0.899 0.913
Observations 1093 1093 1093
Notes: Dependent variable is natural log of the research funding score. Column 1 includes log average salary and log
sd salary only. Standard errors in parenthesis. Log Professorial FTE is the natural log of the total FTE of full professors
in the department. Log REF FTE is the natural log of the total number of FTE (including non-professorial researchers)
submitted to the REF evaluation. Panel Member = 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether the REF 2014 main panel
or sub-panel included a member of the department. Log Vice Chancellor pay is the natural log of the total remuneration
(including salary and discretionary payments) paid to the University Vice Chancellor. Standard errors in parenthesis. *
Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A9: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 Funding Score at Main
Panel Level on Changes in Departmental Wage Structure, 2013 - 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
Main Panel FS (Incl. Dept) 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.025
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.017)
% Age under 40 -0.010 1.680 0.023 8.009***
(0.059) (1.317) (0.023) (2.766)
% Age 41-50 -0.049* 0.776 -0.006 0.856
(0.028) (0.622) (0.011) (1.306)
% Age 51-60 0.004 0.283 -0.003 -0.503
(0.025) (0.553) (0.010) (1.161)
Log REF FTE -0.005 0.499 -0.002 0.040
(0.015) (0.330) (0.006) (0.692)
Main Panel FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.022 0.018 0.007 0.056
Observations 269 269 269 269
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable and
funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by GPA and
FTE) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. In this regression the Funding Score is differences at
the level of the Main Panel. Other control variables are differences between the matched departments in levels measured
in the 2013 data. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A10: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 GPA at Main Panel Level
on Changes in Departmental Wage Structure, 2013 - 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
Faculty GPA Score (Incl. Dept) -2.646 0.028 -0.013 4.633
(2.530) (0.103) (0.046) (5.477)
% Age under 40 0.194 -0.030 0.030 1.584
(1.321) (0.054) (0.024) (2.859)
% Age 41-50 -0.575 -0.005 -0.003 0.058
(0.645) (0.026) (0.012) (1.397)
% Age 51-60 1.034 0.011 -0.002 -1.097
(0.646) (0.026) (0.012) (1.398)
Log REF FTE -0.184 0.014 -0.002 0.214
(0.215) (0.009) (0.004) (0.466)
R-squared 0.041 0.013 0.009 0.011
Observations 258 258 258 258
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable and
funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by Funding
Score) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. In this regression the GPA Score is differences at the
level of the Main Panel. Other control variables are differences between the matched departments in levels measured in
the 2013 data. * Denotes significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Table A11: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of REF 2014 GPA on Changes in
Departmental Wage Structure by REF Main Panel, 2013 - 2016. Sample of All Matches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Log Change Log Change Change Total
Mean Salary Top Quartile Wage Bill Gini Coeff. FTE Professors
Main Panel A: Medicine
Dept GPA Score -2.084 -0.029 -0.051 9.009***
(2.073) (0.081) (0.036) (1.895)
R-squared 0.119 0.068 0.039 0.069
Observations 102 102 102 102
Main Panel B: Science & Engineering
Dept GPA Score 0.779 0.095** 0.030 5.364
(1.265) (0.069) (0.026) (3.103)
R-squared 0.021 0.058 0.068 0.077
Observations 143 143 143 143
Main Panel C: Social Sciences
Dept GPA Score 0.935 0.097*** -0.019 4.813***
(1.672) (0.017) (0.039) (1.316)
R-squared 0.014 0.055 0.018 0.066
Observations 169 169 169 169
Main Panel D: Arts & Humanities
Dept GPA Score -2.047 -0.105 0.004 -1.873
(2.159) (0.077) (0.037) (3.485)
R-squared 0.063 0.096 0.033 0.062
Observations 127 127 127 127
Note: Table shows OLS estimates from difference-in-difference models based on Equation 22. The dependent variable and
funding score variables are the differenced variables, calculated as the differences between matched pairs (by Funding
Score) in the first-differences in the variables between 2013 and 2015. Samples divided by REF 2014 Main Panel. Other
control variables are differences between the matched departments in levels measured in the 2013 data. * Denotes
significance at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** at 1% level.
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Figure A1: Correlation Between Mean Pay and GPA Score
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Note: Each observation represents an individual academic department. Figure show scatter plots and fitted regression
lines. Observations grouped by REF Main Panel (Plot group A) and University Type (Plot group B).
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Figure A2: Correlation Between Gini Pay and GPA Score
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Note: Each observation represents an individual academic department. Figure show scatter plots and fitted regression
lines. Observations grouped by REF Main Panel (Plot group A) and University Type (Plot group B).
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Note: Each observation corresponds to an individual university. Figure shows a scatter plot of total remuneration of
university vice chancellors (x-axis, including pension contributions and discretionary payments) and log funding score (y-
axis). The red fitted regression line is estimated on all observations; the blue fitted regression line is fitted on observations
excluding the far-right outlier value.
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